The Pervert
Recently, I responded to one of those national chain type bookstores that everyone goes to, for a report that a pervert was in the bathroom taking pictures of people by putting his camera underneath the stall divider. In this particular case, the victim was a 10 year old boy. If you are like me, you would want to do everything you could to find this dirt bag, and when you found him, pray that he would resist arrest. As part of the initial field investigation I immediately contacted the manager–while other officers searched for the perpetrator–and asked to review their security surveillance that was visibly evident from anywhere within the store. Then the manager dropped the bomb shell; there were no actual cameras. The corporation had invested thousands of dollars making it look like there was video surveillance, but in actuality had none. The manager continued by stating that his store gets ripped off rather regularly, because shoplifters come into the store, take something small for the purpose of evaluating the store's loss prevention capabilities, and when they see that the video surveillance does not contribute to anything happening to them, then they come back and take more expensive bounty. In his words, "It's a joke," when he referred to the security posture at his facility.
The Homicide Bomber
This incident reminded me of the debate over what extent video surveillance in London, England, played in foiling more homicide bombers from being successful when that country was viciously attacked by terrorists in July, 2005. In the aftermath of that cowardly attack, like the Madrid (Spain) train bombings of March 2004, the horrific videos broadcast around the world showed the power of what a small explosive device could yield and the devastation it can inflict. But looking closer from the perspective of an investigator, security agents see what is not commonly noticed by anyone else. Images captured on film, optically enhanced, can produce digital evidence that provide "leads" to investigators. Proponents of video surveillance say that is why it is worth the thousands, or in the case of the United Kingdom, millions of pounds spent on developing, maintaining and expanding their optical barb-wired fence. Those less supportive often tout that the effectiveness of video surveillance is limited, basically useless, because of the functional dimension in which it operates. In other words, you can only watch the bombs go off; not stop it.
The Dope Dealer
When I worked as a narcotics detective, I was one of the video operators for our unit's surveillance van. The equipment we used was state of the art, vehicle-mobile, and had the precision that rivaled some military standoff weapon systems. The system worked, and at times didn't, when we filmed targets. During those times that the system proved worthless, the cause was not due to the system design being faulty, but because the strategy planned to use the capability of the system was not applicable to the situation. The fluidness of covert investigations would change sometimes at a moment's notice, with suspects arriving at unplanned locations, cars, other people, tree and shrubbery interference, etc.. In those cases we needed "eyes on" to counter the problem we just incurred, which ultimately meant that another officer had to relocate so they could see what was happening and then broadcast to everyone their observations. In short, it did not matter how much we spent on the most technological video systems available, we still needed people to bridge the gap between evidence collection and apprehension.
The Answer
Before investing copious amounts of capital to build a protective infrastructure that is strictly surveillance oriented, you may want to review the following steps to ensure you are spending wisely:
- ASSESSMENT: What threats are facing your particular facility or community? If dealing with a known (eminent) threat, what are the capabilities of your adversary?
- GOAL: What are you trying to do? Detect them or deter them? Deny them or delay them? All of the above?
- ACCEPTANCE: Understand that video surveillance is only one component to an overall security "system." Learn the limitations of video and do not expect miracles from a TV screen.
- INTEGRATE: Study how to infuse video surveillance into other protective postures. Anyone relying on just one security measure is asking to be defeated.
- RE-ASSESS: Threats evolve; methods of attack change. Keep pace with physical security technology so that your counter measures stay ahead of the curve. Establishing forms of performance measurement also helps during the evaluation process.
Talk to anyone who has to fight and survive for a living and they will tell you that having "high SA"–or high situational awareness–is what keeps them alive. Ideally, you want to sense the danger before you see the threat. As the earth continues to revolve, our world changes and there is no shortage of bad guys to contend with. Merging historically proven physical security "best practices" with high technology is a winning combination. Video surveillance is useful, but it is only one piece of the pie, and the sum, I would argue, is only great because of the assimilation of its parts.