A little after 1930 hrs on Jan. 12, 2001, as I lay on the laundry room floor of an armed suspect's residence, a burning sensation in my right leg and left foot, the magazine of my pistol empty and my team's shield man lying wounded next to me, the sound of rounds whizzed by. What I thought would never happen to me had become reality: I was in the thick of a lethal-force encounter, and I was under-prepared.
That day, which forever changed my attitude toward lethal-force training and preparedness, began more than nine hours earlier. I was a third-shift patrol officer in the Anniston (Ala.) Police Department (APD) and an active entry member of the APD's Special Reaction Team (SRT). After completing patrol duty at 0700 hrs, my partner and I decided to drive to Atlanta to visit a police equipment supply store.
At approximately 1000 hrs, my SRT pager activated. The message: 10-61 911, our code for an SRT callout. My partner and I left Atlanta and headed for Anniston. At approximately 1145 hrs, we reached the station, where I was told the SRT was meeting at the Calhoun County Sheriff's Office (CCSO) for mission brief and planning. I immediately went to the CCSO to meet up with my team.
The Intelligence
The CCSO held psychological evaluation papers to serve on a male subject who lived on the east side of Anniston, a nicer part of town. The subject's son informed the CCSO his father had a stockpile of weapons, including a high-power rifle, food and other various supplies, and had told his family he would kill anyone, including his family and especially the police, who invaded his property. In a 12-page letter, the subject claimed he was God's disciple; everyone else was a soldier of the devil.
With this intelligence, the CCSO decided to send more than a couple of deputies to the residence. At the time the CCSO did not possess a fully trained and equipped SRT, so they called the APD for help.
Attempts to Make Contact
After formulating our plan, we loaded up and drove to the predetermined rally point near the subject's house. The house had a main floor and a full walkout basement. We staged one six-man entry team on the north side of the residence, which formed a solid brick wall without windows or doors. A second team got into position on the northeast side, where there was an open carport.
One of our negotiators failed to make contact via telephone. The phone company advised us the subject's phone was working but off the hook.
Next, a negotiator with the team on the northeast side began efforts to make contact via bullhorn. The negotiator used phrases from the 12-page letter in attempt to provoke a response. We also cut power to the residence, hoping the lack of heat would cause enough discomfort to elicit a reaction. We attempted contact by bullhorn for approximately seven hours without any luck. Finally, we introduced gas grenades into several rooms of the main and basement floors.
Even this effort to gain a response from inside the residence failed. At approximately 1930 hrs, we decided to make entry. A front- or rear-door entry was too risky, so we opted to enter through the carport, but we had one problem. The subject had parked his car against the storm door leading into the residence. We agreed to breach a window that led to a laundry room on the right side of the carport door and send in the shield man and three operators. The rest of the team, at least four members, would breach the carport door and make entry behind the first four-man element that entered through the window.
We Make Entry
Using a hooligan tool, I breached the window. The shield man, two other operators and I dropped through and waited for the rest of the team to breach the carport door and get into position. Immediately upon entering the laundry room, an 8' x 10' space, we observed the door to the rest of the residence was closed. We left it shut. All four of us had donned our masks for protection from the gas we'd deployed earlier. I was armed with a Glock 22C .40-caliber pistol. The shield man was armed with a Glock 18 (like the Glock 17 but capable of full auto) and several 30-round magazines. The other two operators carried Colt submachine guns; each had several 30-round mags.
Ten minutes passed. Finally, we got notification the other team had breached the carport door and was good to go. We opened the laundry room door. The rest of this report is a personal recollection of the situation.
Barrage of Gunfire
The first thing I saw, looking through the kitchen into the living room, was a ceiling-high barricade made of stacked boxes and furniture. One path from the laundry room through the narrow kitchen led into the living room. I still remember what went through my mind: "Oh shit, this doesn't look good."
The next few seconds are either blurred or completely blank. The next thing I can accurately remember is lying on the floor of the laundry room, aware of a burning and tingling sensation in my left foot and right leg. I assumed I'd been shot, but I didn't feel any pain. I looked around and saw my shield man lying next to me. My partner was up covering the threat area and returning fire. Our fourth man was knocked to the ground. I looked at my pistol and noticed the slide was locked to the rear and the magazine was empty. I heard rounds whizzing by.
We made a quick assessment of the situation and decided it was time to back out. My partner, who was armed with a Colt submachine gun, motioned for us to get out while he lay down directed fire. The shield man and I stood up and made our way to the window. I assisted the shield man, who was having trouble, and then pulled myself out. The other two operators followed. The other entry team never made it beyond their entry point.
After we crawled to safety, the team medics checked us out. I was hit in my left foot; the round shattered the bones and lodged in the heel of my boot. Another round fractured the fibula in my right leg and stopped. The shield man took a hit that went through his shield, shattered his wrist and penetrated several layers of his entry vest. He'd attempted an emergency reload but failed due to the damage to his wrist. He also suffered massive blood loss from another round that entered his right leg, shattered his femur, ruptured his femoral artery, tore through his scrotum and ended up in his left leg. My partner, who had covered us while we got out, took one round in his right arm and one that penetrated his gas mask and entered between his eyes. Luckily, the round stopped in his sinus cavity. The fourth operator got out without a hit. The medics evacuated us to the hospital via patrol cars because there was no time to wait on the ambulances.
After we were evacuated, the rest of the SRT deployed smoke and more gas into the residence. A short time later, the residence caught fire and burned to the ground. The following day, investigators searched through the rubble and found the suspect, deceased, sitting on the bottom step of the basement stairs with a double-barreled shotgun at port arms, as if prepared for round two. He sustained three bullet wounds one to the head, one to the torso and one in the leg. The fire did not kill him; he'd sat down on the steps and bled out.
Further investigation revealed the suspect's elaborate preparations. All main-floor windows were covered with heavy black plastic. The basement windows were blocked with mattresses and wood. The basement door was chained and locked. The suspect had constructed a horseshoe-shaped barricade upstairs by filling cardboard boxes with books, magazines, golf balls and rolled coins. He'd positioned himself behind the barricade directly in front of the fireplace and next to an exterior wall with a window. He'd opened the flue to the fireplace and opened the window a few inches for a steady flow of fresh air. Shooting lanes led from the barricade to all main entry points of the residence. Behind the barricade, investigators found a large supply of ammunition and several weapons, including an M-1 carbine fitted with a makeshift flash suppressor and a snub-nose .38-caliber pistol with all five rounds spent. Spent casings littered the floor.
Of particular note: The suspect was a 76-year-old, highly decorated WWII combat veteran. He knew what he was doing.
Lessons Learned
The lessons I learned are my own and are not necessarily the views of the APD. I believe the SRT as a whole had become complacent. We were a very active team, and we had not encountered any serious injuries or confrontations. I had not mentally prepared myself to deal with a situation like this, and I had not actively trained for this type of situation.
I'm sure it's not possible to be totally mentally prepared, but you can better prepare yourself by training with numerous officer survival techniques. I had not practiced various potentially life-saving procedures, such as emergency reloads under stress. The lethal-force encounter psychological effects you learned about in the police academy are real. Unfortunately, I had to experience the effects to understand this lesson. I don't remember firing any rounds. I don't remember hearing anything during the opening of the gun battle. Yet I emptied a 15-round mag, the shield man emptied a 30-round mag, and another operator emptied two 30-round mags. I can't speak for the other injured officers, but I didn't feel any pain until I was in the hospital about 30 minutes later.
The will to survive kicked in. We all got up, despite our injuries, and got ourselves out of the kill zone, instead of expecting others to risk their lives to get us out. But I feel I owe my life to my partner, who covered us with a bullet in his head and a pro-mask full of blood so that we could get out. That's the will to survive.
Now I take training seriously, and I constantly research and read everything I can that pertains to officer survival. But it shouldn't have to take an incident like this to wake up to the reality of lethal-force encounters and get out of the "it will never happen to me" mentality.
My advice: Don't shortchange your training. Train as much as you can, even if it is on your own time and expense. (After all, it is your life you are protecting.) Be alert for new tactics and techniques that make sense. Never give up, and train as if your life is on the line.
Brad Bowdoin served as a patrol and SRT officer in the Anniston (Ala.) Police Department from 1998 2002. For the past four years, he's been an SRT/marksman/observer tactics instructor with the U.S. Army Military Police School, and a Department of the Army Civilian Police Academy instructor in Ft. Leonard Wood, Mo. He also served as a reserve deputy and SRT member in the Pulaski County (Mo.) Sheriff's Department. He recently accepted a position as a full-time SRT member at Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Ala.
Send us your stories!
Have you experienced an interesting or difficult law-enforcement situation that taught or reinforced a tactic, strategy or philosophy? If so, tell us about it. We want the stories and lessons-learned in this monthly department to come from you, the reader. Remember, your experience might save the life of another officer. Send up to 1,800 words to [email protected].