Editor’s note: There are some incidents, regardless of age, that are so critical to police tactics and officer safety they should never be forgotten. On August 1, 1966, 25-year-old Charles Whitman killed his wife and mother in their homes and then ascended the University of Texas Tower in Austin and committed the first recognized mass shooting at an educational institution in U.S. history. The lessons learned during this incident are still powerful and relevant today.
The Incident
Whitman began his attack inside the tower at approximately 11:45 a.m. He had dressed as a janitor and concealed his weapons and supplies in a foot locker, which he hauled to the observation deck on a dolly. Whitman barricaded himself on the observation deck and began firing at the community below. By the time the incident was over (more than 90 minutes later), Whitman had shot 45 people in and around the tower, wounding 31 and killing 16, including Austin Police Department (APD) Officer Billy Speed. His farthest victim was shot from approximately 500 yards away and most were shot during the first 20 minutes of the attack. Dozens more were wounded by fragments of flying limestone, concrete and glass. Some suffered from heat exhaustion and severe burns from the sun and hot asphalt after being pinned down for so long in the 96-degree heat. Others were injured by falls during their rush to escape. Many believed the attack involved numerous gunmen because of the amount of fire coming from the tower and the high number of dead and wounded.
The Response
At 11:52 a.m., the APD received the first call about the shooting. Officer Houston McCoy was the first officer assigned to the call. He quickly realized his issued shotgun was worthless. McCoy received a rifle from a university student and he went to a hardware store to purchase several boxes of ammunition for the rifle. Unarmed school security officers entered the building by 11:55 a.m. but were helpless to do anything except lockdown or evacuate the rest of the tower. Armed citizens and officers returned fire at the tower while other citizens and officers rescued hundreds of trapped and injured individuals. They applied pressure to wounds with clothing and used belts as tourniquets. An armored bank truck was used to rescue at least two victims.
APD Officers Houston McCoy, Ramiro Martinez, Phillip Conner, Jerry Day, Harold Moe, George Shepard and Milton Shoequist entered the tower and ascended to the top. They were joined by Texas Department of Public Safety Agent W.A. “Dub” Cowan and an armed civilian, Allen Crum. Conner, a former army medic, provided treatment to victims inside the tower. Officers breached Whitman’s barricade and got onto the observation deck where Officers McCoy and Martinez shot and killed Whitman.
Lessons Learned
SWAT: The most commonly referenced lesson learned from this incident is the recognition of the need for SWAT teams. However, Whitman was ultimately neutralized by patrol officers. In later years, some would argue that agencies became overly dependent on SWAT for similar incidents. This debate continues today and has resulted in greater tactical capability on the part of those most likely to be first on scene.
Patrol rifles: Editorials in Austin newspapers in the weeks following the shooting demanded to know why APD officers hadn’t been properly equipped with rifles prior to the incident. Public comments included acknowledgement that officers need to have equipment that’s at least equivalent to that owned by the civilian population. Despite this incident and many others since, there are still agency administrators who fear negative reaction from the public if an officer is seen carrying a rifle.
Medical training: Conner and Martinez were both former army medics and Crum used his military training to direct other civilians in caring for the wounded. All officers should know how to treat themselves and others in basic lifesaving measures using both commercially available and improvised materials. Consider establishing a tactical emergency medical support (TEMS) patrol group using select officers who possess advanced medical training.
Rescue of victims: Dozens of rescues were performed during this incident by officers and civilians alike. None of them would have had training in this topic except perhaps those with prior military experience. The ability to drag, carry or assist victims to safety and medical care is essential. Patrol cars and large civilian “hard” vehicles, such as fire trucks, garbage trucks and armored bank trucks may offer cover.
Mutual aid & recalling off-duty officers: At time of this incident, the only means to recall off-duty personnel was by calling their home phones. Now with e-mail, text and cell phones, officers can be quickly recalled with a few mouse clicks. Some high-threat locations might allow for pre-established staging areas. This is no time for kingdom building or trying to showcase your agency. Request and accept adequate assistance early through previously established mutual aid agreements.
Command & control: The officers in this incident acted without direction from supervisors. Good command and control is great, but officers responding to such an attack need confidence that they’ll be allowed to improvise and take advantage of opportunities to act decisively and end the terror without having to wait for approval from supervisors. Despite advances in communication technology, officers might be unable to communicate with command personnel for various reasons. Train personnel so that you may trust them to take independent action in the initial minutes. Be prepared to stage and assign the cavalry coming to assist the initial officers.
References
1. Lavergne, Gary. A Sniper in the Tower: The Charles Whitman Murders. Denton: University of North Texas Press, 1997.
2. Martinez, Ramiro. They Call Me Ranger Ray. Rio Bravo Publishing, 2005.