Training the single responder for judgmental aggression scenarios, Part 1
On Dec. 14, 2012, the 200 officers, detectives and support staff of Roswell (Ga.) PD were shocked and saddened as news reports of the Sandy Hook School shooting captured the world's focus. The Roswell Police Training Unit Team, like other public safety training units, collected intelligence and news reports from this terrible event, seeking lessons to better prepare its own officers for an active shooter/active killer incident. Following is a description of the results of this preparation.
Our Plan
After much spirited debate, the Roswell Training Unit reached the consensus to offer five scenario-based incidents all utilizing a single law enforcement officer response to aggression. Sandy Hook provided the incentive to push beyond what officers had been previously exposed to with judgmental lethal/less lethal scenarios training. The department-wide training was conducted over a six-week period.
The five incidents were carefully scripted and delivered so that all officers got the exact same incidents to resolve. The objectives were for students to understand the appropriate conditions and restrictions for deployment of their department issued handgun (Glock 22), conducted electrical weapon (Taser X26), expandable baton (ASP), OC spray, and crisis intervention team (CIT) techniques. By the end of the eight hours of training, officers would have used each force option at least once and their Taser twice.
As officers arrived for the initial classroom portion, they were directed to secure all firearms, handcuffs, batons, magazines, pepper spray, knives and their Taser cartridge. They were told to bring their empty duty belt and Taser. A designated safety officer searched all participants, including the role players. The safety protocols were repeated after lunch: Many training tragedies happen when weapon safety inspections are not repeated after officers' return from lunch.
Once the scenarios started, officers were individually dispatched from the classroom and required to run approximately 50 yards to increase their heart and breathing rates. They reported to the briefing/safety officer for a final inspection and were given a loaded Simunition Glock, Taser (training cartridge or dud, depending upon scenarios) and inert OC spray, and a briefing.
Scenario One (Deadly Force)
The officer was dispatched to an occupied elementary school on a dispute between an adult male parent—AKA, "bad guy"—and the school principal. Dispatch tells the officer that the caller is the assistant principal pleading for the officer to hurry, and that the principal is wearing a blue hat. Dispatch informs the officer that there is "no backup assistance available!"
As the officer turns the corner of the building, the scenario is "live" and he can see the principal (blue hat) trying to stop the parent from entering the school building.
As the officer approaches, there is a digital recording of children playing over loud speakers from inside the school building. At this point, the adult male parent begins yelling loud enough so that the officer can hear him, and the principal walks away. As the officer approaches, the "bad guy" will insure that his empty hands are visible to the officer. The "bad guy" will ignore the officer until the officer is within 20–25 feet and then the bad guy will turn slowly to face the officer and give the officer time to see the blue training weapon protruding from his jacket. The "bad guy" will slowly start walking towards the school entrance yelling "I am going to kill them all!" The "bad guy" will not remove the firearm before entering the building.
Respond to Aggression: Officer's Statistics
One hundred and ten officers and detectives completed this incident. Eighty-two officers (74.5%) used lethal force to stop the suspect's entry into the school. Thirteen officers (11.8%) deployed their Tasers. One officer (0.9%) deployed O.C. spray. Two officers (1.8%) attempted crisis invention training (CIT) skills to convince the angry parent to calm down and relax. Twelve officers (10.9%) allowed the suspect to enter the school while the officer shouted commands for the suspect to "STOP!" The officers allowing entry never used force as the suspect entered the school.
Instructors explained the extraordinary risk to children, teachers and the officer by confronting a suspect in possession of a firearm with a less-lethal option. All the "less lethal" officers realized they failed to protect the lives of innocent children and teachers. After feedback and discussion with instructors, these officers repeated the incident. All of these officers deployed lethal force that was objectively reasonable, and they were grateful for the opportunity to learn from their initial mistakes.
The objective was to ensure that all officers left the training having successfully completed all of the scenarios. As officers individually completed the scenarios, they were allowed to watch subsequent officers' performance. This allowed for excellent post-incident discussion and feedback.
Feedback was offered for those officers who delayed using lethal force until the suspect was entering the school. Instructors reinforced that allowing the suspect into the building created the worse possible tactical scenario. Once inside the building, the suspect would have countless targets, which could be shot instantly. Furthermore, the officer's backdrop changed from a solid wall to a hallway full of children and teachers scattering in every direction in an effort to escape.
During the scenario some officers chose to circle around the "bad guy" driving him towards the doorway and the children. It was explained to officers that when responding to a crime in progress, if possible, approaches should be made to drive the suspects away from the building to prevent them from entering or reentering the building.
Lessons Learned
A majority of officers did not immediately observe the butt of the bright blue Simunition handgun that was clearly visible against the background of the all-black Taser training suit. After watching so many officers enter the scene, instructors and role players could easily determine when an officer finally saw the weapon because of the "startled" reflex many exhibited. Many officers stopped in their tracks, moved rearward, moved laterally to change their approach or offered an involuntary verbal utterance (Law Officer readers can select their favorite—instructors heard them all).
Having knowledge of visual limitation factors (focal vision and selective attention) provides an explanation why eyewitnesses and trained law enforcement officers have difficultly seeing what really happened and miss objects and movements that may appear obvious to others. The importance of visually scanning suspects especially to the threat areas (hands, waistband) was strongly emphasized to officers before the scenarios started. The eyes may be the window to the soul, but officers will be assaulted by what a suspect(s) is holding in his/her hands.
Although many officers immediately drew their firearms to either a high- or low-ready position, a surprising percentage (approximately 30%) did not draw their firearms but engaged the suspect verbally: "Do you have a gun?" or "Don't touch the gun!" or "Drop the gun!" These officers acknowledged seeing the blue training gun but attempted to rationalize to the instructors that since the suspect was not holding the weapon, these officers didn't feel they had the justification to display their firearm or use lethal force. Coaching and feedback was immediately provided.
Their Own Noise
Auditory exclusion played a critical role with the diminished information the officer needed to make the best possible objectively reasonable force option decision mandated by Graham v. Connor. More than half of the officers reported not being able to hear the suspect's specific threats. Initially, instructors added amplification to the "bad guys" mask, but some officers still continued to say they couldn't hear the suspect. Instructors then realized that this was because the officers were continuously shouting repetitive verbal commands. As a result, they couldn't hear anything the suspect was saying.
Half of the officers reported they never heard the sound of children playing over the loud speakers. The instructors also noted that for the officers who continually screamed verbal commands that the longer and louder they shouted, the more the officers own stress levels increased, which severely limited their ability to think or adapt to even minor scenario changes.
Instructors unanimously agreed that those officers who gave one or two loud verbal commands with strong command presence were calmer and functioned at the highest performance level. They were able to focus on the immediate threat in front of them but also have awareness of the total incident scene.
Forcing Engagement
On the first day of the training Capt. Ken McRae entered the scenario, identified the weapon and issued two very loud and clear commands for the "bad guy" not to move or touch the weapon. The suspect and anyone within 50 yards of the scene would have clearly heard and understood McRae's commands. McRae then listened as the "bad guy" explained that he was going to "kill all of the children." As soon as the "bad guy" began moving towards the open door McRae was able to fire eight rounds in less than two seconds, scoring all center mass hits on the moving suspect. Following the scenario McRae stated, "I continued to fire because the suspect did not stop his aggression towards the children."
In the next part we'll examine how we encourage single responding officers to engage at an appropriate level with baton, OC, Taser and/or CIT.